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Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. 
Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of 
human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment 
challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by 
contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s 
theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that 
phenomenology does not have to choose between any of these positions. Central to the outline 
I offer is that there are multiple approaches to non-conceptual content in play today. By separating 
them we can begin to oversee the diversity of phenomenological contributions to the debate about 
non-conceptual content. I conclude that current literature presents us with at least three sound 
phenomenological accounts of non-conceptual content, but also that these are generally not 
incompatible with conceptualism.






Университет г. Гронинген (Нидерланды), философский факультет.
9712HE Гронинген, Нидерланды.
E-mail: corijnvanmazijk@hotmail.com
В последнее время мы имеем дело с возрастающим интересом к теории концептуализма 
Макдауэлла, в то же время появилось много неоднозначных феноменологических тракто-
вок этой теории. Одни феноменологи считают, что концептуализм подразумевает чрезмер-
ную интеллекутализацию человеческого опыта. Другие, обосновывая свою точку зрения 
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ссылками на тексты Гуссерля, полагают, что теория наполнения Гуссерля ставит концепу-
тализм под вопрос, и что его понятие «реальное содержание» — не-концептуально. Другие 
же, напротив, полагают, что в своих принципиальных моментах поздняя феноменология 
Гуссерля согласуется с теорией концептуально информированного опыта Макдауэлла. Так 
кто же прав? В своей статье я намереваюсь показать, что феноменологии нет необходимо-
сти совершать выбор между этими двумя точками зрения. Главное, на что мне хотелось бы 
обратить внимание, это то, что в настоящее время существует большое множество мнений 
по поводу вопроса о не-концептуальном содержании. Если их проанализировать, то мы 
столкнемся с различными феноменологическими подходами в дискуссии о не-концепу-
тальном содержании. В своей статье я прихожу к выводу, что современная исследователь-
ская литература занимается, по крайней мере, тремя феноменологическими подходами 
к не-концепутальному содержанию. Это, однако, не означает, что эти подходы принципи-
ально несовместимы с концепутализмом.
Ключевые слова: Феноменология, не-концептуальное содержание, концептуализм, про-
странство смыслов, интенциональность, Макдауэлл, Гуссерль.
1. INTRODUCTION
McDowell’s Mind and World (McDowell, 1996) recently provoked considerable 
discussion among philosophers working in a broadly phenomenological tradition, 
of which the recent collection of essays The McDowell / Dreyfus-Debate (McDowell, 
2013) is probably the most noteworthy display. McDowell’s central thesis in Mind 
and World is that the contents of experience are conceptual. A number of theories of 
non-conceptual content pre-date this thesis. The past decades have seen considerable 
scholarly effort in analytic philosophy of mind to develop an account of non-
conceptual content. Starting with Evans’s Varieties of Reference (Evans, 1982), the 
idea of non-conceptual content was popularized by among others Cussins (Cussins, 
1990), Crane (Crane, 1992), Peacocke (Peacocke, 1992) and Bermúdez (Bermúdez, 
1994; Bermúdez, 1995). The concept was subsequently taken up in debates about 
phenomenal content, where it is now often accepted by both representationalists 
(Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995; Lycan, 2015) and phenomenalists (Block, 1995).
According to Bermúdez’s early and still popular definition, a non-conceptual 
content is one that represents the world without demanding that its bearer should 
possess the concepts required to specify that content (even though s/he may in fact 
possess them) (Bermúdez, 1994, 403). By the same rule, a conceptual content would 
be one the subject cannot have without possessing concepts that could specify the 
content. In other words, conceptualism is simply the doctrine that the contents 
of experience would not have been the way they are without a subject possessing 
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the relevant concepts required to explicate those contents in a judgment. Whether 
or not one accepts the conceptualist doctrine depends to an important degree 
on certain methodical and conceptual commitments. For instance, whether one 
includes1 or excludes2 sub-personal content, whether one is driven by empirical3 
or phenomenological4 motives, and how one defines notions such as content and 
concept. 
In the phenomenological tradition McDowell’s rejection of non-conceptual 
content has been taken up in very different ways. One of the best represented 
parties takes conceptualism as a (possibly Cartesianist) over-intellectualization 
of human experience (Dreyfus, 2013; Schear, 2013; Siewert, 2013). They believe 
phenomenological reflection reveals everyday forms of sense-making that one cannot 
appropriately address as conceptualized. Hopp (Hopp, 2010; Hopp, 2011) supports 
phenomenological non-conceptualism by arguing that McDowell’s conceptualism 
cannot account for what Husserl in Logical Investigations calls “fulfillment”. Also, 
Crane (Crane, 1992; Crane, 2013) claims that cases of perceptual illusion must involve 
non-conceptual content similar to Husserl’s notion of “real content”. Barber (Barber, 
2008) and Mooney (Mooney, 2010), on the other hand, maintain that Husserl’s later 
phenomenology supports McDowell’s conceptualism.
The central aim of this paper is to bring structure to the wide diversity of 
phenomenological contributions to this debate. There has been a great deal of 
misunderstanding among phenomenologists regarding what it is conceptualists 
like McDowell are after, and phenomenological non-conceptualists often appear 
to have very different agendas. In this paper I explore such differences. On this 
basis, I subsequently distinguish three phenomenological approaches to non-
conceptual content: the static approach, the hyletic approach, and the genetic 
approach. Separating these approaches not only helps bringing to light the great 
variety of phenomenological contributions, but also clarifies the extent to which 
phenomenologists have succeeded in providing arguments against conceptualism. 
Further phenomenological research regarding non-conceptual content should 
therefore take these divides into account.
1 As does Bermúdez (1995).
2 As does McDowell (2009, 271–272).
3 For instance: Block (1995; 2003), Bermúdez (1994; 1995), Dretske (1995), Tye (1995) and Lycan (2015).
4 Among others: Crane (1992; 2003; 2013), Dreyfus (2005; 2013), Hopp (2010; 2011), Doyon (2011), Schear 
(2013), Siewert (2013).
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2. MCDOWELL’S CONCEPTUALISM
In his much celebrated book Mind and World, McDowell aims to develop 
a satisfactory understanding of the relation between thought and experience with 
respect to problems of belief justification. His principal concern is to offer an account 
for how an experience can provide warrant for a belief. The very problem at stake, 
McDowell believes, is a conceptual one that we inherited from modern philosophy. 
It can only be solved by reconsidering the fundamental relation between thought 
and perception. The idea of conceptual capacities operative in receptive experience 
is supposed to do just that.
Let us first consider this conceptual problem in more detail, given that 
McDowell frames his conceptualism as a response to that. According to McDowell, 
twentieth century epistemology has suffered from a certain dilemma regarding how 
or by what a belief can be justified. This dilemma finds its roots in a separation of 
two realms of being characteristic of modern philosophy. On a (somewhat simplified) 
empirical foundationalist account, sense data provide us simple ideas that are causally 
related to external reality yet also inform our spontaneous thought. On this picture, 
sense data are somehow conveniently two-legged: while informing spontaneous 
thought, they also offer a foothold in a lawful, external reality. 
The dilemma McDowell identifies concerns the different roles one can assign 
to sense experience. If we grant sensations the double role just outlined, we admit 
that experience has epistemic efficacy; it can provide us warrants for beliefs. To this 
extent, experiences belong to the “space of reasons”. Yet at the same time, sense data 
also belong to external, physical reality. They are bare, natural “givens”, and to that 
extent they are part of the “space of nature”. Like others before him, among others 
Sellars (Sellars, 1997) and Evans (Evans, 1982), McDowell deems this double role of 
sensations unacceptable. The idea of conceptual capacities operative in experience 
is in part a response to this fallacious model. 
On the empiricist picture just sketched, sensations belong to two images of 
reality at once: the “space of nature”, as an image ruled by natural laws, and the 
“space of reasons”, as a realm of human action and responsibility. McDowell follows 
Sellarsian tradition by referring to this notion of sensation as the “Myth of the 
Given”. To invoke the idea of a given, according to McDowell, means to extend the 
space of justification more widely than the space of reasons, that is, into the realm 
of causal nature (McDowell, 1996, 7). The problem McDowell has with this is that 
a conception of causally impinging sensations can only yield “exculpations where 
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we wanted justifications” (McDowell, 1996, 8). A belief may be caused by a natural 
event; it is not thereby justified by it. 
To avoid a Given, it should therefore be granted that whatever is located in 
the space of nature cannot function as a reason or belief in the space of reasons. 
This, however, brings us to the other horn of the dilemma. For it appears that if we 
drop the Given we must opt for a coherentist account such as Davidson’s (Davidson, 
1986), according to which beliefs can be justified by other beliefs only. McDowell 
seems to think this alternative does not fare much better than the empiricist picture: 
“coherentist rhetoric suggests images of confinement within the sphere of thinking, 
as opposed to being in touch with something outside it” (McDowell, 1996, 15). 
Coherentism, or so McDowell suggests, denies our rational faculties access to the 
empirical world and is therefore prone to skepticism.
The dilemma to which conceptualism responds has now loosely been set: 
either we commit to a Given, or we lose the idea of thought-exercises onto a world 
of experience. Neither of these options seems very appealing. What is needed, 
on McDowell’s reading of the problem, is a philosophical explanation of man’s 
place in reality that does not commit a naturalistic fallacy (as in early modern 
empirical foundationalism) but also does not suggest a confinement imagery (as 
does coherentism). In brief, in order to circumvent the ongoing oscillation between 
these two positions, McDowell proposes that we regard intuition as already invested 
by the relevant conceptual capacities that could be put into play upon a discursive 
apprehension of what we experience. Experiences (or “intuitions” in the Kantian 
jargon) unguided by concepts — “blind intuitions”, as Kant said — do not exist5. 
If we want to think of our thoughts as bearing onto external reality, then we should 
conceive of intuition and sensation as already conceptually structured. This way, we 
can maintain thought’s bearing on reality without committing to a given. 
Put as simple as possible, McDowell’s claim is roughly that because perceptual 
experience is thus endowed with conceptual capacities, i.e. has conceptual content, 
we have avoided invoking a non-conceptual Given to mediate the space of reasons 
and outer reality. At the same time, the very idea of intuition, as we also find it in 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy, should suffice to preserve the idea of a touch of our 
senses upon the external world, thus helping us to avoid a coherentism or “Cartesian” 
internalism. Intuition preserves a touch of our senses upon an external world, even 
5 See especially Lecture I of Mind and World (McDowell, 1996), also A50/B74 of Kant’s first Critique (Kant, 
1998).
63HORIZON 6 (1) 2017
though, simultaneously, the immediate contents of intuition are conceptual, thus 
avoiding the Given. It can be helpful to note here that the external world in case 
is not one located outside of the realm of the conceptual (McDowell, 1996, 54). 
In a way, on McDowell’s picture, reality itself is conceptually invested, but it is 
nonetheless an external reality and one that we are principally in touch with through 
sensibility6. 
The idea of conceptually “saddled” intuition needs further characterization and 
this is offered by reference to our so-called second nature, where McDowell’s notion 
of Bildung first comes to the fore (McDowell, 1996, 84–86; McDowell, 1998, 184–
188). The notion of Bildung plays a very important role in McDowell’s philosophy. 
It is supposed to explain how our natural sensibility (first nature) can involve 
processes that are in a sense non-natural (second nature), insofar as they belong 
to the space of reasons. Bildung, as a natural potentiality that we are born with for 
the cultural development of a space of reasons, serves in a way to keep the space of 
reasons down to earth. On the one hand, McDowell thinks that “spontaneity-related 
concepts cannot be duplicated in terms of concepts whose fundamental point is to 
place things in the realm of law” (McDowell, 1996, 74). Conceptual exercises, then, 
cannot be explained in terms of the space of nature. Yet McDowell does not want 
to suggest that the space of reasons is entirely “extra-natural” either, as that would 
make conceptualism a form of “rampant Platonism”. Crudely put, the notion of 
Bildung, functions as a kind of bridge (at least conceptually speaking) between these 
two paradigms of explanation.
McDowell thus aims to conceive of two heterogeneous “spaces of intelligibility”. 
So how, then, can conceptual capacities operate onto sensibility, which consists of 
natural operations? The answer is that McDowell thinks of the space of nature as 
not exclusively a lawful space, and therefore, in some sense at least, it could involve 
conceptual capacities, such that “a concept of spontaneity that is sui generis […] 
can nevertheless enter into characterizing states and occurrences of sensibility” 
(McDowell, 1996, 76). Put differently, by widening the standard conception of the 
space of nature — it is construed as broader than the realm of law7 — McDowell 
6 Substantial confusion might have been avoided had McDowell been clearer about this. For one, MacDonald’s 
(2006) discussion with McDowell (2006a) appears to rest on confusion regarding the meaning of McDowell’s 
externalism. 
7 “So long as we do not dispute that something’s way of being natural is its place in the realm of law, the con-
cept of spontaneity functions in the space of reasons, so as to rule out the possibility that spontaneity might 
permeate the operations of sensibility as such” (McDowell, 1996, 75). Also: “We can acknowledge the […] 
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thinks he can maintain that conceptual capacities are “actualizations of our 
nature” — and to this extent that rampant Platonism is avoided — while at the same 
time deny that they are purely natural — to the extent that a “bald naturalism” 
(which reduces all talk of reasons to nature) is also avoided.
McDowell certainly is not unaware that what he opts for appears ambivalent: 
“…it looks as if we are picturing human beings as partly in nature and partly outside 
it” (McDowell, 1996, 77). If McDowell’s conceptualist picture is to cohere, he needs 
to say more about the exact relation between the natural and non-natural realms, i.e. 
between the spaces of reasons and nature — and this is where the notion of Bildung 
comes to the fore. 
According to McDowell’s sketchy specification of Bildung, human beings 
engage in a process of cultural development by which they attain a second nature; 
a vast collection of habits of thought that structure experiences independently of the 
agent’s deliberation. Such a second nature allows for “having one’s eyes opened to 
reasons” (McDowell, 1996, 84), i.e.: for having sensory experiences that are reasons 
for belief and that have the appropriate conceptual structure to make them figure in 
belief states. The idea of rejecting the given is not supposed to involve denying that 
we have a first nature. Rather, McDowell’s claim is that once a rational agent has 
been raised with second nature, the contents of his/her experience are, at least in 
one sense, non-natural, in that they belong to the (non-Platonic) realm of reasons8.
It is good to emphasize that there is something deeply un-phenomenological 
about McDowell’s distinction between spaces of reasons and nature and the role 
Bildung plays therein. For McDowell, sensibility is principally a matter of nature. 
That is, it can be assessed unproblematically in naturalistic terms. For one, animals, 
McDowell notes, “are natural being and no more”; they are “entirely contained within 
nature”; their “sensory interactions with their environment are natural goings-on” 
(McDowell, 1996, 70). The conceptual sphere of reasons, by contrast, is the only thing 
that cannot be so understood. As McDowell puts it, there are only “some second-
natural phenomena that […] natural science cannot accommodate, on the ground 
that their intelligibility is of the special space-of-reasons kind” (McDowell, 2006b, 
236, my italics). The adjective “special” here can be substituted with “conceptual”. 
Interestingly, McDowell here submits that the conceptual is special not just for its 
realm of natural law, that is empty of meaning, but we can refuse to equate that domain of intelligibility with 
nature, let alone with what is real” (McDowell, 1996, 109). 
8  See also McDowell (1998, 167–197) for a more elaborate exposition of two sorts of naturalism.
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role in justifying beliefs. Moreover, it is taken to be the only aspect of our experiential 
lives that natural science cannot account for.
On McDowell’s picture, then, we have two distinct realms of explanation: 
a space of reasons and a space of nature. In between them, so to say, we have a notion 
of Bildung which suggests a “genesis” of that which we cannot explain in lawful 
terms (the conceptual space of reasons) from the natural realm. So what could be 
un-phenomenological about this? Crucially, phenomenology — at least in Husserl’s 
paradigmatic form — rejects the idea of a selective application of natural science to 
sensibility and a selective application of epistemology to conceptual structures. From 
Husserl’s point of view, the very distinction betrays the inability to see the unity of 
conscious life throughout both its subjective and objective aspects, and between its 
lower level “natural” accomplishments and its higher level “rational” ones. Husserl, 
in fact, criticizes traditional psychology roughly for a picture similar to the one 
McDowell appears committed to. As Husserl notes, the main mistake of naturalistic 
psychology is “that it posited the passivity of association and of the whole psychic 
life unfolding without the activity of the I at the same level with the passivity of the 
physical natural process” (Husserl, 2004, 333). “However”, Husserl continues, “passive 
motivation is, like all spiritual causality [...] a sphere of understandability standing 
under pure essential laws and, therefore, having a completely different meaning than 
natural causality and natural lawfulness” (Husserl, 2004, 333). 
What Husserl means is that the structure of that space which cannot be made 
understandable in terms of the kind of intelligibility that belongs to the realm of law 
is not marked exclusively by conceptual or higher level cognitive activity. Whereas 
for McDowell only some phenomena cannot be accommodated by natural science 
and therefore belong to the special space of reasons, Husserl contends that the entire 
distinction between supposed natural contents of consciousness and higher level 
contents of the space-of-reasons kind is artificial. There is no way to limit the spiritual 
life to a rational responsiveness to reasons and to demarcate it from lower level 
accomplishments. 
From a phenomenological point of view, then, the distinction between 
a space of reasons — which only includes conceptual structures — and a space 
of nature — which includes natural sensibility — is artificial. There is, in terms 
of the intelligibility belonging to nature, no radical distinction to be made 
within the contents of consciousness. Husserl holds that the whole streaming 
life of consciousness must be said to have its own essence, all the way down into 
the operations of passive sensibility — operations McDowell takes to belong to 
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lawful nature — and must be understood in conformity with that essence if true 
intelligibility is to be acquired.
The very idea of conceptualism therefore operates on a conceptual scheme that 
is entirely unknown to phenomenology — or at least Husserl’s systematic version 
of it. Against Husserl, McDowell believes that if we want to maintain the idea of 
a rational constraint from experienced reality, then the idea of conceptual capacities 
operating in sensibility must be the only option. This is because McDowell does not 
accept the possibility that the space of reasons includes anything other than the 
conceptual, since all lower level accomplishments of consciousness belong simply 
to the space of nature. Only the conceptual has its place in the space of reasons, 
and this is why “we cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which 
a judgment is warranted except as relations within the space of concepts” (McDowell, 
1996, 7).
Broadly construed, then, the motivation behind McDowell’s conceptualism is 
to provide an alternative picture of the relation between mind and world which puts 
an end to the oscillatory state between empirical foundationalism and coherentism. 
The oscillation is between our commitment to a fallacious myth of the given and 
a picture which cuts us loose from reality. On the first view, the space of nature spills 
over into the space of reasons; on the second picture, our minds float freely over and 
above reality. The new images suggests that we are in touch with reality, but that this 
very touch is conceptually invested. 
I think this should more or less capture the core of the conceptualist thesis 
as McDowell defends it. However, on a closer reading, it shows that McDowell says 
a number of different things with respect to what the conceptual investment of 
experiences amounts to exactly. With regard to this, I think it is worth distinguishing 
between three different conceptualist theses. 
First, we can distinguish what I call hard conceptualism. According to hard 
conceptualism, the contents of experience simply are concepts. This is an intuitively 
implausible position. McDowell, however, appears to express sympathy for it in at 
least two places in Mind and World. Right in the opening of the book, he asserts 
that “relations in virtue of which a judgment is warranted” can only be understood 
“as relations within the space of concepts” (McDowell, 1996, 7). Further on, he 
repeats this idea negatively: “if experiences are extra-conceptual, they cannot be what 
thoughts are rationally based on” (McDowell, 1996, 68). This appears to suggest that 
only concepts can serve as reasons for beliefs, which would make perceptual content 
quite literally a type of concept.
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Many critics of McDowell have taken him to support hard conceptualism. But 
the previous remarks notwithstanding, McDowell does not appear to endorse hard 
conceptualism. McDowell is not out to suggest that there are no phenomenological 
differences between thinking and perceiving, i.e. that the content of a thought 
is identical to the content of a perception. If we look at those fragments where 
McDowell explicitly addresses the meaning of conceptualism, we find him endorsing 
something weaker than hard conceptualism. Let us consider the following three 
fragments: 
The way I am exploiting the Kantian idea of spontaneity commits me to a demanding 
interpretation of words like “concepts” and “conceptual”. It is essential to conceptual 
capacities, in the demanding sense, that they can be exploited in active thinking. 
(McDowell, 1996, 47, my italics)
An intuition’s content is all conceptual, in this sense: it is in the intuition in a form in 
which one could make it, that very content, figure in discursive activity. (McDowell, 
2009, 265, my italics)
[This] is what it means for capacities to be conceptual in the relevant sense: they 
are capacities whose content is of a form that fits it to figure in discursive activity. 
(McDowell, 2013, 42, my italics)
These three fragments all state that it is intuition’s openness to conceptual 
explication — not its being a concept — which defines its conceptual nature. I call 
this thesis weak conceptualism. According to weak conceptualism, the contents of 
experience are such that they can be taken up into rationality, and are conceptual just 
to that extent. Weak conceptualism in the sense specified only demands openness 
to reason of all experience. I believe weak conceptualism is the principal thesis 
McDowell wishes to defend. 
Lastly, a third conceptualist thesis is worth specifying. On what I call full 
conceptualism, the contents of experience are conceptual in this sense: they can be 
taken up into judgments in the way weak conceptualism specifies, but for that to be 
possible at all, rational capacities must already figure in them. The full conceptualist 
doctrine thus adds a conditioning factor to the weak definition, namely that some 
conceptual capacities must be at work in experience in order to make it open to 
reason in the first place. 
It is not entirely clear to me what role full conceptualism plays in McDowell’s 
conceptualist theory in Mind and World. Although there is frequent mention of 
conceptual capacities figuring in perception in Mind and World, which thus points 
to full conceptualism, those places where McDowell explicitly defines conceptualism 
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are usually formulations of weak conceptualism, as I showed above. I will not try 
to resolve this issue here, but instead continue with a perhaps somewhat “generous” 
reading of McDowell, which subscribes primarily weak conceptualism to him. 
3. PHENOMENOLOGICAL NON-CONCEPTUALISM (1):  
THE STATIC APPROACH
In the recent book The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, Dreyfus turns to the works 
of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for examples of pre-reflective, skillful action in 
order to challenge McDowell’s conceptualism. According to Dreyfus, the idea that 
the understanding is “inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility” 
(McDowell, 1996, 46) is fundamentally at odds with the phenomenological 
description of what he calls skillful or absorbed coping9. 
Drawing on Heidegger, Dreyfus shows that we do not have to think about 
the doorknob on the door in order to use it to enter or leave a room. In fact, the 
doorknob does not have to be apprehended at all. Absorbed copings, on this 
existential-phenomenological understanding, are mindless activities; they involve 
no objectification and therefore no rationality. For Dreyfus, this means that it is 
inappropriate to characterize their contents (in so far as there would be any content 
here at all, on his view) as conceptual. To acknowledge the phenomenological 
structure of absorbed coping is to deny the permanent presence of operations of the 
understanding. The conclusion Dreyfus but also Schear (Schear, 2013) draw from this 
is that McDowell’s theory of conceptual intuitions rests on an over-intellectualization 
of human experience (Schear, 2013, 294–299).
Does this criticism pose a genuine problem for McDowell’s conceptualism? 
The basic structure of the argument just outlined appears to be as follows10: 
(P1) The involvement of concepts requires an intentional structure founded upon  
a distance between a subject and an object
(P2) Absorbed or skillful coping does not involve an intentional structure founded 
upon a distance between a subject and an object 
(C1) Absorbed or skillful coping does not involve concepts, i.e. is non-conceptual
The argument against conceptualism rests in part on the acceptance of premise 
(1): that the involvement of concepts demands some kind of a critical stance that 
9  I also discuss Dreyfus’s case for non-conceptual content in Mazijk (2014a; 2014b).
10  I base this syllogism largely on the one Schear (2013, 294) uses in his reading of Dreyfus.
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is typical for judgment. That presupposition, however, is denied by a number of 
philosophers, among others Noë (Noë, 2013), Crane (Crane, 2013), but also McDowell 
(McDowell, 2013) himself. As I pointed out already in the previous section, the 
conceptual capacities McDowell sees integrated in experience do not depend so 
much on a specific phenomenology of experience; they do not require that a subject/
object-distance typical of judgment is involved. 
McDowell wants to convince us that experience is ‘saddled’ with conceptual 
capacities due to our cultural upbringing, which results in the openness of 
experience to reasons. According to what I called weak conceptualism, the contents 
of experience (i) have the appropriate structure to figure in a judgment while full 
conceptualism adds that this (ii) is due to the involvement of rational capacities in 
them. In the case of skillfully opening a door, (i) is supported by the fact that one can 
make the skillful action of using the doorknob figure in a judgment. Also, one can 
give reasons for having performed this action in hindsight. This particular experience 
is therefore not beyond rationality. Moreover, it seems that if I would I have lacked 
all knowledge about how doorknobs work, the building I am in, and about the room 
behind the door, then the unreflective experience of opening the door might well 
have had a different content. This indicates that some sort of rationality may in fact 
have figured passively in this skillful action after all. 
A second example Dreyfus discusses concerns a game of chess (Dreyfus, 2013, 
35; McDowell, 2013, 46–50). Dreyfus holds that a chess master may be “directly 
drawn by the forces on the board” without making his move for any consciously 
entertained reason (Dreyfus, 2013, 35). Again, the example is supposed to show that 
rational capacities are not necessarily involved in experience, because meaningful 
acts can also be executed passively. 
But the argument is not very convincing. McDowell’s response is simply that 
“cultivated rationality […] is also operative in his [the chess master] being drawn 
to make his move by the forces on the board” (McDowell, 2013, 48). McDowell 
therefore does not reject the phenomenology of skillful coping as Dreyfus argument 
presupposes. He simply claims that forces, too, are permeated by rationality in 
the same sense in which opening doors is. McDowell’s conceptualism is thus left 
unchallenged by the arguments put forward by Dreyfus11.
11 McDowell in fact endorses a broadly Gibsonean account of experience, which might bring him considerably 
closer to Dreyfus than the latter believes. See McDowell (1994, 202). 
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Hopp (Hopp, 2010; Hopp, 2011) provides a different argument against 
McDowell based on Husserl’s early theory of fulfillment in Logical Investigations12. 
To put it simply, Husserl thinks thought by itself can be merely empty. The mere 
thought about a coffee mug on my desk cannot does not give me the coffee mug 
“in the flesh” as a perception of it would. Perception can deliver a surplus to the 
emptiness of thought in case a synthesis between the two intentions takes place. For 
instance, when I think about a particular coffee mug and subsequently turn my head 
to perceive that very mug, a synthesis of recognition takes place between these two 
intentions. The experience I am now undergoing could not have been established 
would I merely have had the empty thought of the coffee mug. Although in case of 
a vivid memory a “quasi-fulfillment” between the thought and the memory may 
take place, only perception can make that distinctive contribution in the process of 
verifying empty intentions. Hopp’s argument is that perception must therefore have 
extra-conceptual content, since the conceptual contents of thought alone can never 
deliver that contribution (Hopp, 2011, 103–148). 
Hopp (Hopp, 2011), then, claims that McDowell is unable to address the 
different epistemic roles played by perception and thought respectively. Because 
conceptualism addresses the contents of perception as conceptual, it fails to do justice 
to the important justificatory differences between perception and thought.
I think Hopp’s point that perceptual fulfillment involves a non-conceptual 
surplus is correct. But it seems Hopp’s discussion circumvents the question 
how perception can accomplish the fulfillment of thought in the first place. 
Conceptualism, by contrast, does provide an answer to that question. It offers an 
explanation as to why an intuitively presented content can figure in perceptual 
judgment — namely because the perception already involves the passive activation 
of conceptual capacities. So whereas Hopp thinks a phenomenological account of 
fulfillment forces us to speak of non-conceptual content, McDowell ascribes the very 
possibility of an immediate perceptual warrant to its conceptual content. 
The way I see it, the reason the arguments developed by Dreyfus and Hopp do 
not really threaten McDowell’s position is that both operate with a static approach 
to non-conceptual content. The reason for calling their approaches “static” is that 
their definitions of non-conceptual content do not draw on one’s experiential past 
or “second nature”. For Dreyfus, a content is non-conceptual if the respective act 
12 I also discuss Hopp’s argument in Mazijk (2015).
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lacks an active subject. For Hopp, an experience involves non-conceptual content 
if it is capable of intuitively fulfilling thought intentions. Neither of these notions 
takes interest in the passive operations of rational capacities in experience, which is 
a central tenet of conceptualism. 
4. PHENOMENOLOGICAL NON-CONCEPTUALISM (2):  
THE HYLETIC APPROACH
A number of philosophers and phenomenologists have appealed to cases of 
illusion to illustrate that perception must have non-conceptual content (Crane, 1988; 
Crane, 1992; Bermúdez, 1995; Bermúdez & Cahen 2011; De Vries, 2011). The core idea 
here is that to make sense of illusion, we need to posit two levels of representation. 
One of these levels presents the intentional object the subject is directed at; the other 
is a sub-personal representational content. 
Crane (Crane, 1992) argues that the famous Müller-Lyer illusion shows us the 
existence of non-conceptual content. Even when confronted with evidence that both 
lines are equally sized, one remains to see one as being longer than the other. We 
must, then, distinguish between what the subject intends — two lines of different 
lengths — and a sub-personal level of representation, in order to account for the fact 
that there is a sense in which both lines are given as of equal length. As De Vries 
(De Vries, 2011, 49–51) proposes, this thought can be taken two ways: either such 
sub-personal representational contents are only involved in cases of illusion, or we 
take them to be permanently operative. Since the second is obviously more plausible, 
all perception must have non-conceptual content.
In a similar way, though from a somewhat different angle, Dretske (Dretske, 
1995) separates “systemic” from “acquired” representations. He illustrates that with 
an example of two dogs which are conditioned differently. Whereas one dog is trained 
to salivate upon hearing a clarinet play any musical note whatsoever, the other does 
the same thing on hearing a C-note regardless of the instrument on which it is 
played. Now consider a C-note is being played on a clarinet, thus causing both 
dogs to salivate. According to Dretske, both dogs will have different “acquired” 
representations: one intends a clarinet, the other a C-note. But at a non-conceptual 
level, they have identical representations (as they are exposed to the same sound data). 
A third variation of this argument appears in Crane (Crane, 2013), where 
Crane draws on a Husserlian distinction between “real” and “general” content. 
Husserl writes: “Every chance of alteration of the perceiver’s relative position alters 
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his perception, and different persons, who perceive the same object simultaneously, 
never have exactly the same perceptions. No such differences are relevant to the 
meaning of a perceptual statement” (Husserl, 1984, VI §4).
Husserl suggests that although one is typically related to a single object over 
the course of a perceptual act, the exact ways in which it is given changes incessantly. 
The side of the object directly given changes as one moves around, but this does not 
change the object of perception. It seems impossible to imagine that for every slight 
variation in the “how” of a perceptual appearance there would be a different object 
given intentionally. Therefore, although the contents of experience might still be 
conceptual at the level of object-representation, perception must also involve content 
which is constantly changing. Husserl usually speaks of “real” or “hyletic” contents 
here. Crane, somewhat unfortunately perhaps, calls them phenomenological contents 
(Crane, 2013, 245). 
Since, as I argued earlier, openness to judgment is the principal criterion 
for conceptual content on McDowell’s account, it might seem that the arguments 
discussed offer resources to rebut conceptualism. Since (as quoted above) “every 
chance of alteration of the perceiver’s relative position alters his perception”, and 
these continuous changes of content cannot all be conceptualized by the ego-subject, 
they have to be non-conceptual. 
As with the arguments developed by Dreyfus and Hopp, I believe Husserl’s 
account of hyletic content convincingly proves the merits of positing non-conceptual 
content for a phenomenological theory of experience. However, I think it is doubtful 
whether it presents any serious obstacles to conceptualism, at least to the extent 
I outlined the argument above. McDowell could simply reply that hyletic content 
is not a part of the experience of rational animals in the sense he is after. Husserl 
too notes that hyletic contents are constitutive of intentionality but not themselves 
intentional (Husserl, 1983, 203). Without any further elaborations with respect to 
the role hyletic contents play in justifying beliefs on Husserl’s account, it could fairly 
easily be argued that they are plainly a form of sub-personal “psychological” content. 
To be fair, I strongly doubt Husserl would accept reducing hyletic content 
to epistemically superfluous contents that can be explicated sufficiently in the 
natural realm of law. On Husserl’s account, hyletic content is not sub-personal 
psychological content; it contributes to a transcendental clarification of meaning 
and knowledge. But to develop that point properly would, I think, require a much 
more thoroughgoing critique of McDowell’s account of spaces of reasons and nature 
from the viewpoint of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. I will not attempt 
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to do so here. As it stands, the hyletic approach to non-conceptual content does not 
necessarily threaten McDowell’s idea that experience makes something available 
that is open to rational scrutiny, since a conceptualist could set such contents aside 
as epistemically irrelevant sub-personal processes. 
5. PHENOMENOLOGICAL NON-CONCEPTUALISM (3):  
THE GENETIC APPROACH
There is another potential phenomenological path to non-conceptual content 
which has thus far been ventured less, but which should nonetheless be demarcated 
from the approaches discussed thus far. This third approach, which I address as the 
genetic approach, is best illustrated by means of Husserl’s later so-called “genetic 
phenomenology”.
In his later work, Husserl develops a new approach to a transcendental 
clarification of meaning and knowledge. In these later writings, which include the 
course lectures Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (1918–1926), Formal 
and Transcendental Logic (1929), and Experience and Judgment (1939), the task 
of a transcendental clarification becomes a search for a so-called “genesis”. This 
genesis is sought above all in concrete receptive experience. Without here entering 
into the details of these analyses, Husserl’s claim is roughly that passive, pre-
predicative experience offers the ground of all fundamental logical-conceptual 
categories. Passivity, on Husserl’s account, “is the mother soil [Mutterboden] of 
knowledge” (Husserl, 2004, 332). The central point of these analyses is that passive 
experience brings about a complexly pre-structured world prior to conceptual 
thought. Prima facie, this account directly opposes McDowell’s to this extent that 
passive experience does not get its complexity from rational capacities, but pre-
structures the world in pre-predicative ways from out of itself.
Recent debates about non-conceptual content in Husserl’s later work focus to 
an important extent on the methodology of Husserl’s analyses on passivity. What 
is at stake here is to what extent or in what sense passivity for Husserl would be an 
abstraction from actual experience. This discussion in part revolves around the 
question of the pervasive impact of conceptual thought onto passivity (secondary 
passivity). As Barber notes, “Husserl’s genetic method […] could be taken to imply 
that the contributions of receptivity and spontaneity are never distinct” (Barber, 
2008, 86). In another article, Mooney adds his own turn of phrase, tating that for 
Husserl to perceive without latent concepts would be an “epistemically innocent” 
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ability which one “loses for good” after childhood (Mooney, 2010, 39). Barber (Barber, 
2008) Mooney (Mooney, 2010) both end up supporting Husserlian conceptualism 
by crediting the latter’s analyses on fields of sensations abstractions from actual, 
mature human experience. Much of this debate rests on the following fragment 
from Experience and Judgment: 
When we distinguish […] receptive experience, on the one hand, and […] predicative 
spontaneity, on the other, this distinction of levels should not be construed as if the 
different operations were somehow separate from each other. On the contrary, things 
which must be taken separately for the sake of analysis and which, genetically, are 
recognized as belonging to different levels of objectification are as a rule actually 
closely entwined. (Husserl, 1997, 203–204)
The conceptualist’s interpretation of this fragment — call it the abstraction 
thesis — reads that concepts must play some part already in passivity, given Husserl’s 
remark that both are actually closely entwined. For that reason, an original passivity 
as illustrated by Husserl’s analyses of fields of sense is in reality an abstraction. They 
might obtain for the experiences we had at some point in the past, but they are no 
longer operative in mature consciousness. It can subsequently be argued that Husserl 
is a conceptualist after all, because for adult human beings perception is permeated 
with rational capacities through and through. It is only by taking Husserl’s abstract 
discussions too literally that phenomenology could appear to object to conceptualism.
Those adhering to the abstraction thus believe that Husserl supports 
conceptualism even though it may not appear so at first sight. Apart from Husserl’s 
own remarks on the way different levels of objectification are actually closely 
entwined in real life activity, there are doubtlessly passages scattered among Husserl’s 
work which appear to commit him to conceptualism of some sort. Husserl notes, 
for instance, that perception is a field of “possible substrates of cognitive activities” 
(Husserl, 1997, 37), that it is “impregnated by the precipitate of logical operations” 
(Husserl, 1997, 42), and that “concepts are not just our business” but instead “belong 
to the world […], are intrinsic to its very being” (Husserl, 2001b, 92)13. At least where 
our conscious lives as responsible agents is concerned, Husserl seems to endorse 
some form of conceptualism.
13 „Die Begriffe sind nicht unsere Sache, die nur uns Erkennende angeht. Das Seiende seinerseits ist nicht in 
sich, den Begriffen fremd. Ferner, erkennen wir begrifflich denkend und einsehend Gesetze, so sind wir nicht 
Gesetzgeber und die Dinge an sich ohne Gesetze, sondern der Welt selbst als seiender gehören die Gesetze 
zu, von ihr in ihrem Sein unabtrennbar” (Husserl, 2001b, 92).
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Nevertheless, I find the abstraction thesis not very convincing. This is 
because it runs against the basics of Husserlian phenomenological methodology. In 
transcendental phenomenology, there are no questions at all about childlike versus 
adult consciousness; there is only transcendental consciousness. In transcendental 
phenomenology one can only investigate what is indubitably given. As Husserl 
explains in Experience and Judgment, genetic investigation rather involves an 
additional epoché in transcendental consciousness, by which the phenomenologist 
disregards higher levels of synthetic achievements in order to get lower level ones 
better into sight (Husserl, 1997, 56). Hence fields of sense are no abstractions from 
actual consciousness; they are synthetic and indeed non-conceptual achievements 
which, as Husserl notes explicitly, are still fully operative in mature consciousness 
(Husserl, 2001a, 167).
The right way to address the issue of abstraction is, I think, to distinguish 
between abstraction in two senses: (1) abstracting from what is real (or in the 
phenomenological case “given”) and (2) abstracting in the sense of bracketing 
certain strata of achievements of consciousness in order to uncover aspects of 
intentionality that otherwise remain hidden. Only the latter reading is compatible 
with phenomenological methodology14. For that reason, fields of sense might well 
qualify as non-conceptual operations — although to be sure this does not imply 
a commitment to a myth of the given, as would be the immediate consequence in 
McDowell’s conceptual scheme. 
In spite of my disagreement with Barber and Mooney on the point of 
abstraction and fields of sense, I think they are on the right track that, at least 
insofar as we enter the field of attentive perception — which involves the intentional 
directedness of an ego-subject toward a perceptual object (an intentionality unknown 
to the radically passive fields of sense) — we are dealing, according to Husserl, with 
“a world in which cognition in the most diverse ways has already done its work” 
(Husserl, 1997, 31). One could therefore plausibly maintain that the later Husserl 
maintains some version of full (and weak) conceptualism. However, to my mind, 
this would have to be one that restricts the tacit employment of rational operations 
14 This second reading allows us to understand Husserl’s remarks on abstraction simply as a careful note to the 
reader that in everyday experience one cannot separate all these layers as neatly as Husserl is forced to repre-
sent it by his commitment to analytic precision, without thereby implying abstraction in the first sense. Note 
that, with regard to the fragment quoted, this much simpler explanation also better fits the context in which 
the fragment appears, which is right at the opening of Part II of Experience and Judgment, which bridges the 
analyses of passive to active synthesis.
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to perceptually attentive modes of experience, in order to allow for non-conceptual 
fields of sense15.
6. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to outline some of the trends of thinking about non-
conceptual content in contemporary phenomenology. I outlined different versions of 
conceptualism and subsequently categorized recent phenomenological engagements 
in three groups according to how they approach the debate.
Generally speaking, I think ongoing discussions reflect a great deal of creativity 
among phenomenologically oriented philosophers with respect to debates about 
conceptualism. I hope the distinctions introduced in this paper help expose the 
originality of these contributions more clearly. At the same time, ongoing discussions 
often betray a somewhat simple understanding of McDowell’s conceptualist thesis. 
More specifically, they generally reflect little concern for McDowell’s complicated 
picture of the relations between reasons and nature. The conceptualist thesis is, 
however, carefully tied into that picture. With such a great variety of interesting 
contributions now at our disposal, it thus seems that the call for a sustained 
phenomenological critique of the deeper philosophical commitments that ground 
conceptualism might still be open. 
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